




Limited partnership reform in the United Kingdom
McCahery, J.A.; Vermeulen, E.P.M.
Publication date:
2004
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
McCahery, J. A., & Vermeulen, E. P. M. (2004). Limited partnership reform in the United Kingdom: A
competitive, venture capital oriented business form. (TILEC Discussion Paper Series; Vol. 2004, No. 024).
TILEC.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.







Limited Partnership Reform in the United 
Kingdom: A Competitive, Venture Capital 
Oriented Business Form 
 
 
Joseph A. McCahery* and Erik P.M. Vermeulen** 
 
 
1. Introduction.................................................................................... 2 
2. The Need for a Genuine European Venture Capital Market..... 8 
3. The Organizational and Legal Structure of Venture Capital 
Partnerships.......................................................................................... 13 
4. Regulatory Competition in Europe ............................................ 16 
5. Limited Partnership Law Reform in the United Kingdom ...... 24 
6. Toward a More Efficient Special Limited Partnership Statute26 
7. Conclusion..................................................................................... 30 
 
 
                                                     
* Professor of International Business Law, Tilburg University Faculty of Law, Research 
Associate ECGI (Brussels), Fellow, Center for Company Law and Tilburg Law and 
Economics Center; Goldschmidt Professor of Corporate Governance, Solvay Business 
School. 
** Lecturer in Law Tilburg University Faculty of Law, Fellow Center for Company Law 
and Tilburg Law and Economics Center, and Legal Counsel Philips International B.V. 









This paper evaluates the primary legal and financial mechanisms that help 
support the development of a venture capital market. Specifically, we argue that 
emulating the organization and contractual pattern of the US venture capital 
market could enhance the development of the European venture capital market. 
We first show that the modernization of the ‘venerable’ limited partnership 
form, based on US experiences, offers substantial contracting benefits for 
investors and is crucial to the operation of a mature venture capital market. We 
then argue that the emergence of more efficient limited partnership structures 
can emerge from jurisdictional competition between European states. We argue 
that the United Kingdom, which has recently embarked on general and limited 
partnership law reform, could, in light of the competitive lawmaking 
environment that the ECJ has opened up, be in the best position to enter the 
competition within the EU. It then explores the prominent features of the UK 
special Limited Partnership statute, which makes it possible for venture 
capitalists to organize their contractual relations that are best suited to the 
characteristics of the venture capital market. Finally, our analysis provides an 
understanding of the competitive forces that shape legal change, which has 
implications for the ongoing debate in the Europe over the reform of limited 
partnership law and related business forms.  





This article considers the circumstances under which responsive 
lawmakers will adopt governance mechanisms that could facilitate the 
development of a broader venture capital market in Europe. It is thought 
that should conditions emerge for lawmakers to act proactively, some 
will inevitably look to the differences between the United States and 
European venture capital environments so as to determine which legal 
rules and institutions might be worth replicating. Whilst the lack of an 
entrepreneurial mindset partly explains the differences, there are of 
course other economic factors that may contribute to the difference in the 








relative performance of the two markets.1 The European venture capital 
market is constrained by regulatory hurdles that limit early-stage 
investment, and capital market structures that restrict the ability of 
venture capital funds to liquidate their positions in innovative start-ups. 
In this setting, a fundamental problem for Europe remains how to 
stimulate the development of efficient institutional arrangements that 
encourage investors and venture capitalists to actually invest in start-up 
firms and create a steady supply of entrepreneurs and the necessary 
finance to drive entrepreneurial firms.2 
Much of the literature on private equity shows that the internal 
governance structure of venture capital funds often plays a crucial role in 
financing start-up firms. Accordingly, if governance structures are 
effective in limiting opportunism and controlling the level of risk, 
investors are more likely to contribute capital to start-up firms through 
venture capital funds. Legal business forms that supply parties with 
flexible default rules to align the interests of investors and venture 
capitalists are an appropriate solution to contractual incompleteness. The 
attention to the contractual and organizational structure of venture capital 
funds may increase now that it is widely accepted that the private equity 
market is prone to violent cyclical movements.3 Indeed, jitters in the 
financial market and the prolonged economic downturn have altered the 
players’ attitude and re-enforced the importance of the role of 
governance and organizational structures for economic performance. 
                                                     
1 Cf. J. Bankman and R.J. Gilson, ‘Why Start-ups?’, 51 Stanford Law Review (1999) p. 
51. 
2 See B. Black and R.J. Gilson, ‘Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: 
Banks versus Stock Markets’, 47 Journal of Financial Economics (1997) pp. 243-277; 
R.J. Gilson, ‘Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function’, 49 
American Journal of Comparative Law (2001) pp. 329-358; C. Keuschnigg and S.B. 
Nielsen, Start-ups, Venture Capitalists, and the Capital gains Tax, Center for Economic 
Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research (CESifo) Working Paper No. 742 (2002); 
E.B. Rock, ‘Greenhorns, Yankees and Cosmopolitans: Venture Capital, IPOs, Foreign 
Firm & U.S. Markets’, 2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law (2001) pp 711-744. 
3 Cf. W.W. Bratton, ‘Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate 
Control’, 100 Michigan Law Review (2002) pp. 891-945. 








Given the claims about the importance of organizational and legal 
structures and institutions for the growth of start-ups, it is clear that some 
business forms prove more successful in the long term. In the United 
States, there is a growing volume of empirical studies on the relationship 
between the legal structures and institutions and firm performance. 
Advocates explain that if Europe were to replicate the US market, it 
should give priority to establishing high labour mobility and risk 
tolerance,4 a well-developed stock market,5 and large, independent 
sources of venture capital funding.6 In order to achieve this objective, 
policymakers across Europe attempt to increase the supply and demand 
of venture capital by giving subsidies in the form of tax breaks,7 but 
largely ignore the role of business organization law. Recent research, 
however, shows that government support should be carefully weighed 
against possible negative effects on the venture capital market. First, 
government sponsorship could crowd out the supply of venture capital, if 
it does not encourage all the players in the venture capital industry. For 
instance, a tax incentive to encourage individual investors to pour money 
into a special venture capital fund vehicle could reduce the supply of 
other, relatively more informed venture capital investments.8 Second, 
policy measures that lower the cost of entry and hence attract more 
entrepreneurial start-ups could cut back venture capitalists’ managerial 
                                                     
4 American executives and research personnel often resign to join new ventures. 
Americans have an inborn tolerance of risk, whereas Europeans are generally more risk-
averse. In addition, failure is not something to be ashamed of in the United States; on the 
contrary, failure is appreciated nearly as much as success. See C.J. Milhaupt, ‘The 
Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan: Venture Capital and the 
Comparative Corporate Governance Debate’, 91 Northwestern University Law Review 
(1997) pp. 865-898. 
5 See Black and Gilson, supra footnote 2. They argue that a well-developed stock 
market that allows venture capitalists to exit through an initial public offering (IPO) is 
critical to the existence of a vibrant venture capital market. 
6 See Milhaupt, supra footnote 4. Empirical research shows that independent venture 
capital firms are willing to make early-stage investments. In the United States, most 
venture capital firms are independent private partnerships, whereas in Europe most tend 
to be affiliated to banks, pension funds, corporations and insurance firms. 
7 See, e.g., Keuschnigg and Nielsen, supra footnote 2. 
8 See D.J. Cumming and J.G. MacIntosh, Crowding Out Private Equity: Canadian 
Evidence, Working Paper (2002). 








support, thereby increasing the risk of start-up activities.9 Consequently, 
it might be argued that in a start-up-friendly environment the 
entrepreneurial success rate could decrease.10  
Despite these arguments, this article asserts that flexible business 
forms must play a central role in the development of a robust venture 
capital industry across Europe. If there is a trade-off between the cost of 
entry and the success rate of business start-ups backed by venture 
capital, it seems more important to cut back on government sponsored 
programmes and stimulate business law reform, which benefits 
entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and outside investors alike. The supply 
of a venture capital-friendly business form could help to mitigate the 
moral hazard problems. Not only should the business form statute 
facilitate privately negotiated venture capital contracts, but it should also 
provide efficient guidance to both the parties and courts in the event of 
an incomplete contract. Our analysis suggests that, in an increasingly 
competitive environment, European countries will arguably be better off 
by improving the infrastructure in which a venture capital market can 
develop and offering clear-cut advantages than by pursuing a one-sided 
stimulation programme. 
One of the central features of the venture capital governance 
environment is the limited partnership structure. This business form 
provides the underpinning of most venture capital funds, allowing 
venture capitalists and investors to create contractual terms that are 
consistent with their respective economic objectives. Effectively, the 
                                                     
9 See Keuschnigg and Nielsen supra footnote 2.  
10 Cf. B. Cassiman and M. Ueda, Optimal Project Rejection and New Firm Start-Ups, 
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Discussion Paper No. 3429 (2002) 
(arguing that reducing the cost of entry does not always increase the start-up rate when it 
leads incumbent and established firms to reduce their research and development 
expenditures): ‘Contrary to common belief, we find that the development of venture 
capital markets and stock markets, or subsidies towards new firms do not always 
increase the start-up rate. This happens when the cannibalization effect is strong. When 
a start-up becomes less costly, the established firm expects that rejecting projects is 
more likely to lead to the start-up of competing firms. Because of this negative 
externality, the established firm reduces the R&D expenditures and consequently less 
ideas will be generated.’ 








limited partnership structure permits venture capitalists to achieve 
extensive control over the operation of their venture capital funds subject 
to few intrusive legal obligations. In the United Kingdom, the limited 
partnership structure has enjoyed an upsurge of popularity since venture 
capital funds were allowed to employ limited partnerships in 1987. 
Whilst the UK limited partnership structure has become popular with 
venture capitalists across Europe, the United Kingdom risks losing its 
leading position to other jurisdictions that have introduced or planned to 
design new legislation comparable to the provisions available under 
Delaware law. One of the purposes of this paper is to discuss the impact 
of regulatory competition in leading states to provide limited partnership 
structures that are more flexible. To illustrate some of the implications of 
this approach, we discuss in greater detail in Sections 5 and 6 below, the 
changes that have been introduced into the UK limited partnership law 
structure, which has been made more adaptable to the needs of business.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
examines whether ‘piggybacking’ on US legal rules and institutions is 
conducive to the development of a mature venture capital industry within 
Europe. It is submitted that, despite its widespread use, piggybacking 
might straitjacket the development of a robust European venture capital 
market. This article will suggest that the modernization of the venerable 
limited partnership form is crucial to Europe’s attempt to emulate the 
successful US venture capital market. 
Section 3 will explain why the limited partnership form is used 
predominantly in the US and European venture capital industry. More 
importantly, it will examine how this business form allows the internal 
and external participants to reduce opportunism and agency costs. The 
analysis will determine which organizational and contractual features of 
the limited partnership make it attractive for venture capital investing. 
This analysis builds on and extends the empirical studies that have 
already been carried out in the United States.11  
                                                     
11 See A. Admati and P. Pfeiderer, ‘Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of 
Venture Capitalists’, 49 Journal of Finance (1994) pp. 371-402; M. Baker and P.A. 
Gompers, The Determinants of Board Structure and Function in Entrepreneurial Firms, 








Viewed in this context, an examination of the competition-induced 
development of the limited partnership form would appear to offer 
essential lessons for Europe as it embarks on business organizational law 
reform in general. Section 4 analyzes the various institutional structures 
in Europe that give rise to competitive lawmaking in the field of 
partnership-type business forms. Indeed, recent decisions of the 
European Court of Justice in Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art could 
trigger the development of competitive lawmaking in Europe, which 
could give member states incentives to adopt, for example, new limited 
partnership statutes that are in line with the requirements of venture 
capital investors. 12  
In section 5 we identify how the United Kingdom stands to benefit 
from meeting the needs of businesses by supplying them with a full 
range of value enhancing business forms. This section focuses on the 
factors that recently led the United Kingdom to modernize the limited 
partnership laws. 
                                                                                                                      
Working Paper (2000); J. Bankman, ‘The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-ups’, 41 
UCLA Law Review 41 (1994) pp. 1737-1768; Barry, et al., ‘The Role of Venture Capital 
in the Creation of Public Companies’, 27 Journal of Financial Economics (1990) pp. 
447-471; P.A. Gompers, ‘Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture 
Capital’, 50 Journal of Finance (1995) pp. 1461-1489; M. Gorman and W.A. Sahlman, 
‘What Do Venture Capitalists Do?’, 4 Journal of Business Venturing (1989) pp. 231-248; 
Th. Hellmann, ‘The allocation of control rights in venture capital contracts’, 29 RAND 
Journal of Economics (1998) pp. 57-76; L.A. Jeng and P.A. Wells, ‘The Determinants of 
Venture Capital Funding: Evidence Across Countries’, 6 Journal of Corporate Finance 
(2000) pp. 241-289; S.N. Kaplan and P. Stromberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets 
The Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, National Bureau 
of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper 7660 (2000); J. Lerner, ‘Venture 
Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms’, 50 Journal of Finance (1995) pp. 301-
318; W.A. Sahlman (1990), ‘The Structure and Governance of Venture-capital 
Organizations’, 27 Journal of Financial Economics (1990) pp. 473-521. 
12 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erthvers-og Selskabbsstyrelsen, [1999] ECR I-1459, 
[1999] 2 CMLR 551 (Centros); Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction 
Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), [2002] ECR I-9919 (Überseering); and Case 
C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd (NL), 
[2003] ECR 1 (Inspire Art). These decisions are available at 
<http://europa.eu.int/cj/en/content/juris/index.htm> (last visited 24 February 2004). 








Section 6 evaluate the implications of creating a separate, free-
standing limited partnership form, such as the UK special limited 
partnership, that allows investors and venture capitalists greater 
flexibility and procedures, thereby reducing their transaction costs. Such 
a vehicle may promote new forms of investment, in that potential 
innovative entrepreneurs and new participants in venture capital 
investing could more easily translate their ambitions into reality. The 
commitment to introducing a new business form could, moreover, 
stimulate high-profile, sceptical domestic and foreign venture capitalists 
to invest in new firms. The prospects for the introduction of a new 
vehicle depend on a variety of factors, including competitive market 
pressures. We posit, moreover, that the competition between lawmakers 
could overcome the path dependent barriers to the introduction of a 
suitably designed vehicle. This seems to be particularly true for the 
business forms and contractual mechanisms that are employed at the 
level of both the venture capital funds and the portfolio firms into which 
venture capitalists pour their money. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. THE NEED FOR A GENUINE EUROPEAN VENTURE CAPITAL 
MARKET 
In this Part, we focus on the main legal and organizational elements 
that are required to support the development of a successful venture 
capital market in Europe. At present, it is widely assumed that, despite 
the venture capital market’s wave of growth in the late 1990s, the 
European market continues to lag considerably behind the United 
States.13 For the European market to mature so as to support further 
phases of economic growth and development, policymakers should focus 
on overcoming the institutional, legal, fiscal and cultural obstacles that 
impose significant costs on firms and investors. As far as the institutional 
and legal obstacles are concerned, we can identify a large variety of rules 
                                                     
13 See A. McCallum, ‘Key Developments at the Heart of the European Union’, 14 
EuroWatch (2002) p. 5 (arguing that despite sustaining an even steeper decline, the 
United States still raised three times more venture capital than the European Union in 
2001). 








that create disincentives for potential entrepreneurs to innovate and for 
risk-averse investors and venture capital funds to make early-stage 
investments. In a competitive lawmaking environment, it is only to be 
expected that some jurisdictions within Europe will continue to adjust 
their business form and securities regulations to satisfy the preferences 
of entrepreneurs and suppliers of capital.  
Yet commentators suggest that in order to overcome these barriers, 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists should attempt to be as ‘American’ 
as possible, preferably by relocating to and incorporating in the United 
States.14 They argue that start-up firms can piggyback on US capital 
market institutions and their securities regulations, including venture 
capital investors.15 Some scholars emphasize that the presence of an IPO 
is perhaps the most significant factor explaining the existence of a robust 
venture capital market. The importance of the IPOs relates to the 
willingness of venture capitalists to invest more money when there is 
security to withdraw funds from an enterprise at a specific date. The 
focus on the exit mechanism is crucial to venture capitalists, not so much 
because of the purported virtuous link between venture capital and a 
national capital market, but because of the availability of different 
efficiency-enhancing mechanisms that allow exit.  
The importance of a national stock market for the growth of a venture 
capital market has already been questioned by scholars, who have noted 
that over the last decade venture capitalists and entrepreneurs have been 
able to entirely bypass their local exchange when exiting the firm or rely 
on trade sales.16 Evidence from Israel’s IT sector, for example, suggests 
that foreign firms may be able to piggyback on another jurisdiction’s 
                                                     
14 See Rock, supra footnote 2. But see E.B. Rock, Coming to America? Venture Capital, 
Corporate Identity and U.S. Securities Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 
Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper No. 02-07 (arguing that despite the fact 
that Delaware markets Delaware incorporation all over the world, US securities law 
allows and invites foreign firms to present themselves as Americans without 
incorporating in the United States).  
15 See Black and Gilson, supra footnote 2.  
16 Venture capitalists consider trade sales as the most important exit vehicle for venture 
capital finance. In fact, for many markets, IPOs are the least probable exit strategy for 
venture capitalists. Cf. Cumming and MacIntosh, supra footnote 8. 








institutions, making it possible to grow a domestic venture capital 
industry at low cost.17 One way to address the absence of a mature 
capital market is for start-up firms to publicly trade shares on a foreign 
exchange. The increasing reliance on foreign regimes to supply the full 
range of regulatory protections that investors prefer could explain the 
greater distribution of firms listing in the United States and the 
impressive development of Israel’s venture capital market in the late 
1990s. It may be, as Rock argues, that foreign IT firms really have the 
option of becoming US firms. Yet there may be little reason to think that 
most of these firms, given their presence in the United States, are 
actually anything more then US firm. The level of institutional investor 
holdings and industry-wide support tends to confirm the view that these 
firms operate and report as if they are US corporations. In this respect, 
contrary to Rock’s assertion, there may be little freedom for Israeli 
entrepreneurs to choose their identity. Indeed, the piggyback hypothesis 
has been a plausible scenario in the capital markets of the 1990s, which 
were heavily influenced by sophisticated US institutional investors and 
financial intermediaries.  
In contrast, European venture capital players tend to work within the 
institutions and legal regimes that are currently available across the 
European Union. Piggybacking is not terribly promising for European 
venture capitalists, since most rely on trade sales as a means of exit. 
Policymakers in Brussels argue that it is of ‘major strategic importance’ 
for the European Union to develop ‘its own financial and entrepreneurial 
capacity to develop its own innovative ideas through new technology 
companies inside Europe’.18 It is asserted that piggybacking cannot 
supply the most fundamental ingredient, which is the presence of 
ambitious entrepreneurs and investors willing to undertake the necessary 
                                                     
17 See Rock, supra footnote 2. 
18 See European Commission, Risk Capital: A Key to Job Creation in the European 
Union, p. 7 (‘[m]any good European ideas – themselves the result of expensive public 
investments in education and research – end up being developed in the United States 
where capital, know-how and the business environment are more conducive to their 
development and success. It means the migration and loss of some of Europe’s best 
talent and best ideas.’). 








risks to create value.19 The need to immigrate to the United States is not 
conducive to an entrepreneurial mindset. High transaction costs, due in 
part to unfamiliarity with the institutional, legal, fiscal and cultural 
infrastructure, may deter potential European entrepreneurs and investors 
with low risk-tolerance from operating as or investing in a US business.20  
In practice, both entrepreneurs and European venture capital funds are 
loath to piggyback on the US market. They tend to invest and divest 
increasingly in their home countries, relying often on their ‘sub-optimal’ 
domestic institutions and legal regimes.21 Venture capitalists are prone to 
avoid risks that result from the uncertainty of unfamiliar foreign 
regulations. In addition, the recent decline in the IPO markets worldwide 
makes it less attractive for firms to seek such a solution. 
The empirical evidence shows that in the past, many European firms, 
under pressure to ‘act American’, have adopted US practices, leading to 
an eventual listing on a US exchange.22 However, the 1990s boom of 
entrepreneurs in Europe, inspired by the overwhelming success stories of 
American high-tech firms, suggests that the current set of European 
                                                     
19 Although Gilson suggests piggybacking, he is aware that entrepreneurs are the most 
important factor. See Gilson, supra footnote 2. 
20 Different Rock, supra footnote 2: ‘The decision to incorporate in the U.S., or to set up 
a corporate headquarters in the Valley, or to seek investments from prominent Silicon 
Valley venture capitalists, may be important not so much in and of themselves, but 
because they teach the entrepreneurs what it takes to succeed and they signal to 
investors that this is a company that understands what it takes to succeed today.’ 
21 See Jeng and Wells, supra footnote 11. See also the European Commission, supra 
footnote 18 (‘there is also evidence of strong regional fragmentation in the EU as well, 
with an overemphasis on ‘domestic’ equity placements.’). To be sure, data shows that 
European firms have listed on the NASDAQ as means of exit. 
22 See J.C. Coffee jr., ‘The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in 
Corporate Governance and Its Implications’, 93 Northwestern University Law Review 
(1999) pp. 673-674 (‘[t]he accelerating pace of this migration may seem surprising when 
one realizes that foreign issuers incur extensive regulatory costs when they enter the 
U.S. markets and that most have never thereafter made securities offerings in the United 
States. Why then do they list? Arguably, companies in smaller markets gain liquidity 
and possibly also some international recognition and prestige from a U.S. listing. But 
greater motivation probably lies in the finding, repeatedly observed by financial 
economists, that the announcement of a dual listing on a US exchange by a foreign firm 
typically increases the firm's share value.’).  








institutions (many of which are not identical to US institutions) will 
eventually be able to bridge the gap between Europe and the United 
States. While the success of some European start-ups in the late 1990s 
can be attributed to their choice of adopting US-style legal rules and 
listing on the US technology exchange, this does not mean that the 
European entrepreneurial environment need not to make adjustments in 
the face of declining competition from US markets. European 
policymakers continue to concede that the creation of an entrepreneurial 
environment is a necessary prerequisite to stimulate the ‘American’ 
mindset and entrepreneurial culture in Europe. To be sure, the success of 
the venture capital experienced a climax during the bubble years of the 
late 1990s when they succeeded in turning innovative ideas rapidly into 
gold. However, the fact that the venture capital industry has undergone a 
profound change over the past few years, in that venture capital funds 
have lost most of the millions of dollars invested in high-technology, 
does not mean that these funds went out of fashion. In practice, with 
bank credit becoming harder to come by, venture capital funds are still 
the only funding source for start-ups. The adaptability of these funds is a 
necessary quality in an ever-changing business environment. 
It might be argued that, unlike piggybacking, emulating US 
techniques could enhance the realization of the much-coveted 
entrepreneurial environment. This process could gain momentum, since 
the US institutional investors are shifting into Europe.23 Over the past 
few years, overseas venture capital funds seeking to invest in European 
firms have established offices across Europe. As a result, considerable 
pressure on path-dependent barriers in the European market may be 
exerted, as US venture capitalists and investors (including their lawyers 
and advisors) convey the ‘American way’ to European players.24  
                                                     
23 See J.A. Adler and F. Monod, ‘American Investors Participating in European Venture 
Capital Funds’, 14 EuroWatch (2002) (noting that US investors are increasingly being 
invited to participate in European Venture Capital Funds). 
24 Cf. G. Hertig, ‘Western Europe’s Corporate Governance Dilemma’, in T. Baums, K.J. 
Hopt, and N. Horn, Corporations, Capital Markets and Business in the Law, Liber 
Amicorum Richard M. Buxbaum (London, Kluwer Law International) pp. 265-282. 








In this context, business forms that make it possible to emulate the 
most efficient US venture capital contracts may well attract sceptical 
entrepreneurs and investors, and may bring a significant increase in the 
amount of venture capital available for innovative start-ups. An 
entrepreneurial jurisdiction could reap the benefits by presenting a set of 
rules that are ideally suited to both start-up firms and venture capital 
funds.25  
Indeed, the recent history of the reform of the private equity limited 
partnership, the standard organization form used by venture capitalists in 
the United States, the United Kingdom and continental Europe to supply 
finance to start-up firms,26 suggests that governments have strong 
incentives to create efficient legal rules designed to meet the needs of 
these funds.  
 
3. THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL STRUCTURE OF 
VENTURE CAPITAL PARTNERSHIPS 
This section turns to examine the source of funding which helps to 
address the basic concerns of venture capital investors, and provides a 
basis to survey the venture capital market. In the main, there are two 
types of venture capitalists: institutional venture capital funds and angel 
capitalists, who are wealthy individuals who make private equity 
investments in entrepreneurial firms.27 Until recently, angel investors 
provided a significant amount of the financing to entrepreneurial 
                                                     
25 Three groups of players can be distinguished in the venture capital industry: outside 
investors, venture capital funds and entrepreneurs. Traditionally, the relationship between 
the first two players is managed and organized in a limited partnership. The venture 
capitalist is the general partner who will invest the limited partners’ money in several 
rapidly growing and highly innovative businesses. 
26 See J. Lerner and A. Schoar, The Illiquidity Puzzle: Theory and Evidence from Private 
Equity, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper 9146 (2002). In 
Europe, however, venture capital funds are often an affiliation to a corporate group. See 
A. Schwienbacher, An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Exits in Europe and the 
United States, Working Paper 2002, pp. 30-31. 
27 See P.A. Gompers and J. Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle (Cambridge, The MIT 
Press 1999). 








companies each year in the United States.28 However, institutional 
venture capital funds have become the main funding source for 
entrepreneurial firms. There are four main types of venture capital funds: 
small business investment companies (SBICs), financial venture capital 
funds, corporate venture capital funds, and venture capital limited 
partnerships. In the United States, the limited partnership organizational 
form is the most popular type of venture capital fund. Even in the United 
Kingdom, where the limited partnership form under the Limited 
Partnership Act was seldom used, this form enjoys unusual prominence. 
There are a variety of reasons for this, such as tax benefits, the flexibility 
surrounding its structure and terms, and its fixed life. Individuals and 
institutions who invest in a limited partnership can delegate investment 
and monitoring decisions to the venture capitalists, who acts as the 
general partner. 
 The flexibility of the limited partnership form allows the internal and 
external participants to enter into covenants and schemes that align the 
incentives of venture capitalists with those of outside investors and 
reduce agency costs. For instance, limited partners are usually permitted, 
despite restrictions on their managerial rights, to vote on important issues 
such as amendments of the partnership agreement, dissolution of the 
partnership agreement, extension of the fund’s life, removal of a general 
partner, and the valuation of the portfolio.29 In addition, limited partners 
employ several restrictions when structuring the partnership agreement. 
In this respect, some have formulated two hypotheses:30 (1) the costly 
contracting hypothesis and (2) the supply and demand hypothesis. The 
former predicts that a positive relationship exists between the use of 
restrictions and the propensity of the venture capitalist to behave 
opportunistically. Hence, in situations such as when the venture capitalist 
raise funds to invest in early stage ventures, the limited partner will use 
more restrictions to structure the partnership. Gompers and Lerner 
(1999) find in their sample of 140 partnership agreements, 14 distinct 
                                                     
28 See A. Wong, Angel Finance: the other venture Capitalist, working paper (2002) 
(explaining that angel investors, which occupy a different segment of the market, 
employ a different level of institutional and control mechanisms than VCs). 
29 See Sahlman, supra footnote 11. 
30 See Gompers and Lerner, supra footnote 27. 








covenants that address problems relating to the management of the fund, 
conflict of interests, and restrictions on the type of investment the fund 
can make. The number and type of covenants correspond to the 
uncertainty, information asymmetry and agency costs in the portfolio 
company. Other factors affecting the use of restrictions are the fund’s 
size, the compensation system of the venture capitalist, and the 
reputation of the venture capitalist. The second hypothesis contends that 
relative supply and demand conditions in the venture capital market 
affects the covenants and restrictions in the long-term contracts. This 
hypothesis predicts that when demand for the services of well-
established venture capitalists changes rapidly, while the supply of those 
venture capitalists is fixed in the short term, less restrictions should be 
observed in the partnership agreements. Accordingly, it can be inferred 
that financial contracts can assist to limit the use of contractual 
restrictions in the partnership agreement. Thus, limited partners use 
restrictive covenants to limit the value erosion caused by uncertainty and 
agency problems, because they are not able to take an active role in 
selecting and monitoring ventures.31 However, contractual restrictions 
can lead to the erosion of value, as they limit the flexibility of the 
venture capitalist to diversify risk and deal with the agency problems in 
each venture. This puts extra pressure on the average return of the 
venture capital funds.32 
 The relationship between the limited partners and the general partners 
can be characterized as a principal-agent relationship, in which the 
principal is required to take precautionary measures to ensure that the 
agent will be less inclined to act opportunistically. The compensation of 
the venture capitalist is comprised of two main sources for managing 
investments in each limited partnership. First, venture capitalists are 
typically entitled to receive 20 per cent of the profits generated by each 
of the funds. A second source of compensation is the management fees 
the venture capitalists charge to each venture.33 Thus seen, the flexibility 
                                                     
31 See Sahlman, supra footnote 11. 
32 See P.A. Gompers and J. Lerner, ‘Money Chasing Deals? The Impact of Fund Inflows 
on Private Equity Valuations’, 55 Journal of Financial Economics (2000). 
33 See Gompers and Lerner, supra footnote 27. 








of the limited partnership plays a critical role in aligning the interests of 
venture capitalists and investors in limited partnerships.34 
 Despite several drawbacks, such as limited partnership shares not 
being publicly tradable and the archaic law governing this form,35 the 
UK limited partnerships have become the standard structure used by 
European venture capitalists in general. That said, the UK’s prominent 
position is under threat from other jurisdictions that have introduced or 
plan to design investor friendly legislation on limited partnerships. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that the Limited Partnership Act 1907 is 
currently under revision.36 The threat of competition, combined with the 
lobbying efforts of venture capitalists and sophisticated investors will 
arguably make UK limited partnership law more sophisticated and 
suitable for venture capital investment. Consequently, the limited 
partnership law reform fits the UK government’s objectives of creating 
modern business organization forms that support the needs of a 
competitive economy. For national policymakers a competitive economy 
means creating an innovative business environment suited to meet the 
needs of entrepreneurs and investors. The supply of appropriately 
designed business forms is an integral component of this strategy, which 
is increasingly being shaped by the forces of competition across Europe, 
which is discussed below. 
 
4. REGULATORY COMPETITION IN EUROPE 
 This section discusses the effect of the competition among national 
rules on the evolution of corporate law rules. We consider moreover the 
incentives of states to respond quickly to the competition by adopting 
efficient legislation that meets business needs and assess whether the 
                                                     
34 See R.J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American 
Experience, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper 248, 2002. 
35 See P. Myners, Institutional Investment in the UK: A Review, 2001. p. 155 (arguing 
that English limited partnership law is particularly cumbersome because of strict 
constraints on the number of partners and on limited partners’ involvement in 
investment advisory work).  
36 See section 5. 








United Kingdom is likely to play a leading role in stimulating regulatory 
competition and experimentation in business statutes.  
 In an important sense, a competitive environment for business forms 
has yet to fully develop due to the siège réel doctrine that governs in 
most member states. In recent years, however, the combination of new 
decisions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the legislative 
blockage in the EC’s company law harmonization program has 
stimulated considerable interest in the competition between jurisdictions. 
While the real seat doctrine continues to restrict firm mobility, the ECJ’s 
recent judgments in Centros, Überseeing and Inspire Art may,37 in the 
near term, encourage the introduction of competitive lawmaking within 
the European Union. Member states may gain by competing to supply 
flexible business organization forms for closely held businesses. In fact, 
some of this sort of competition is stimulated by cross-border tax 
competition.38 Consequently, there are adequate incentives for 
governments to create better business organization vehicles. 
 Thus, a crucial debate in Europe is whether a market for business 
forms will ultimately emerge within the European Union, and if so, 
whether it will be based on a Delaware-like model in which firms can 
freely select their country of incorporation.39 In the face of mounting 
economic pressure to reduce existing levels of regulation, the virtual 
absence of any lawmaking behaviour that arguably resembles the charter 
competition in the United States suggests that there are substantive legal 
and procedural barriers to the establishment of jurisdictional competition 
                                                     
37 See supra footnote 12. 
38 W.J. Carney, ‘The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters’, 26 
Journal of Legal Studies (1997) p. 327; Code of Conduct Group, Report form the Code 
of Conduct Group on Business Taxation to Ecofin Council, 29 November 1999. 
39 See, e.g., W.F. Ebke, ‘Centros – Some Realities and Some Mysteries’, 48 American 
Journal of Comparative Law (2000). pp. 625-628 (explaining that competitive 
lawmaking has become a dominant theme in European company law); B.R. Cheffins, 
Company Law: Theory, Structure, and Operation (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1997) pp. 
421-451 (explaining the potential role of the market for incorporations in deepening 
European economic integration). 








in the European Union.40 Moreover, critics suggest that competition 
based on considerations of business forms will only play a marginal role 
in Europe. Firms (and their participants) that stand to decide where to 
organize their business would set a higher value on the tax rates they 
have to pay on capital income than on available business forms.41 From 
the perspective of the jurisdictional competition paradigm, it is therefore 
more likely that innovative jurisdictions attempt to attract firms and 
capital by lowering their tax rates. Ireland and the Netherlands present 
famous cases of successfully capitalizing on the tax preferences of 
European and non-European business firms.42 
 There is also some evidence that in economies that are integrating, 
such as the European Union, competitive jurisdictions that have an 
excellent infrastructure, established customer and supplier bases, 
accumulated experience, and a well-trained workforce, bring about the 
clustering of industry, high-end services, and foreign investment. This 
clustering process creates forces that encourage spatial concentration, in 
that even more industry, services and capital will move to these 
countries.43 In this view, the clusters allow an attractive country or 
                                                     
40 See F. Scharpf, Governing in Europe, Effective and Democratic? 9 (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 1999) pp. 101-103. 
41 See E. Wymeersch, ‘Centros: A Landmark Decision in European Company Law’, in 
Th. Baums, K.J. Hopt, and N. Horn, Corporations, Capital Markets and Business in the 
Law, Liber Amicorum Richard M. Buxbaum (London, Kluwer Law International 2000) 
(arguing that competition is taking place on the basis of differences in tax laws, labour 
laws and environmental laws in Europe; business forms are not an essential component 
of regulatory competition). Cf. E. Ferran, Company Law Reform in the UK, Working 
Paper (2001) (noting that limited evidence considered in the context of the UK’s 
company law review supports the view that fiscal, operational and macro-economic 
considerations rather than business organization law are the major considerations in the 
decision whether or not to locate a business in a given country). 
42 See W.W. Bratton and J.A. McCahery, ‘Tax Coordination and Tax Competition in the 
European Union: Evaluating the Code of Conduct on Business Taxation’, 38 Common 
Market Law Review (2001) p. 701. 
43 The spatial concentration is at the heart of the economic geography worldview 
(economic geography is the study of where economic activity takes place and why), 
which is underpinned by the ‘new economic geography’ synthesized by M. Fujita, P. 
Krugman and A.J. Venables, The Spatial Economy, Cities, Regions, and International 
Trade (Cambridge, The MIT Press 1999). See also N. Crafts and A.J. Venables, 
Globalization in History: A Geographical Perspective, Centre for Economic Policy 








region to maintain its competitive position, even if it provides rigid and 
cumbersome business organization laws and higher tax rates.44 
Nevertheless, the ECJ decisions and the significant pent-up demand to 
organize a business by using a flexible business form may very well 
result in a competitive jurisdiction being on its guard against other 
jurisdictions trying to undermine its attractiveness.45 This seems 
especially true in the period of the transition to internationalized 
production, which is characterized by an increasing mobility of capital 
service and industry. Under the influence of competitive market 
pressures, a number of member states are driven to institute reforms to 
their tax regimes and business forms not only to stem the flow of firms 
migrating to other countries, but also to gain a reputation for being a 
competitive jurisdiction which satisfies the needs of a range of firms. 
The incentive effect of regulatory competition is also present without 
firm mobility when firms can observe government performance across 
jurisdictions and can sanction political actors whose performance is 
inferior to that of other jurisdictions.46 Furthermore, domestic lawyers 
                                                                                                                      
Research (CEPR) Discussion Paper No. 3079 (2001) (arguing that the economic 
geography worldview is fundamental to understanding comparative economic 
development in the context of globalization). Examples abound of industrial clusters: 
Silicon Valley (a cluster of high-tech firms), German printing equipment, Italian ceramic 
tiles, Japanese robotics and American health care equipment. 
44 According to the 2001 Global Competitiveness Report from the World Economic 
Forum, Finland is the most competitive economy in the world, despite its rigid labour 
markets, powerful unions and high tax rates. See M.E. Porter, J.D. Sachs. and J.W. 
McArthur, ‘Executive Summary : Competitiveness and Stages of Economic 
Development’, in The Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002, World Economic 
Forum. 
45 Cf. R. Baldwin and P. Krugman, Agglomeration, Integration and Tax Harmonization, 
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Discussion Paper No. 2630 (2000) 
(arguing that levying a extremely high tax rate could have catastrophic results for 
competitive countries; not only because capital will move abroad, but also because that 
movement will undermine the attractiveness of the particular jurisdiction in a massive 
and irreversible way). 
46 Cf. A. Breton and H. Ursprung, Globalisation, Competitive Governments, and 
Constitutional Choice in Europe, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for 
Economic Research (CESifo) Working Paper no. 657(2), (2002) p. 4. Thus seen, large 
firms that made irreversible investments and therefore cannot threaten to move their seat 
to another jurisdiction could conceivably join other interests in a lobbying process. See 








who specialize in business formations have a high-powered incentive to 
lobby for competitive business organization laws, even if a jurisdiction 
has gained a reputation as an industrial cluster and a tax haven. 
Indeed, recent developments in EU case law will set the stage for 
strong competition between jurisdictions in furnishing firms with 
optimal rules. Proponents submit that these recent cases permit firms to 
select the least costly legal system. In this view, firms can choose from 
among the number of member states offering more optimal regulations 
and more favourable conditions to long-term relational contracting.47 
The United Kingdom, which has signalled its commitment to regulatory 
responsiveness by offering varied and high-quality business organization 
laws, could be well-placed to establish itself as the leading state for 
European business formations, like Delaware in the United States. But 
charter fees and franchise taxes, which provide a high-powered incentive 
for Delaware to enter the competition for business forms, do not 
encourage the United Kingdom.48 However, the United Kingdom could 
dominate firms’ domicile choice as a side-effect of its aspiration to 
attract large volumes of business and risk capital. In fact, the language 
barrier that creates a real disadvantage for some jurisdictions may lead to 
many firms resolving their conflicts in the United Kingdom. Moreover, 
the United Kingdom has a substantial body of case law and a highly 
respected judiciary which could be an important advantage in this 
                                                                                                                      
also W.W. Bratton and J.A. McCahery, ‘The New Economics of Jurisdictional 
Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World’, 86 Georgetown Law 
Journal (1997) pp. 256-259 (discussing ‘yardstick competition models’ that attempt to 
ameliorate the Tiebout model’s shortcomings by substituting the vote for mobility as the 
competitive mechanism). 
47 See, e.g., R.J. Gilson, ‘Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or 
Function’, 49 American Journal of Comparative Law (2001) p. 352 (arguing that 
Centros signals that venture capitalists and entrepreneurs will shop around for the most 
favourable jurisdiction that offers board control for the venture capitalists and exemption 
from employee participation rules). 
48 See Cheffins, supra footnote 39, pp. 435-440 (noting that from a tax perspective – the 
UK does not have franchise tax and charter fees – regulatory competition is largely 
irrelevant for the United Kingdom). 








respect.49 It also has a responsive legislature that may be motivated to 
develop amendments to its business organization law regime in response 
to demands in the marketplace. Another attractive feature that could have 
a considerable effect on attracting migrating firms is that UK business 
organization law is significantly more flexible vis-à-vis other European 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, the popularity of the United Kingdom for 
firms and financial intermediaries suggests that it is willing to offer legal 
rules that may be attractive for these firms. To the extent that the United 
Kingdom attracts a large number of new firms and is seen as a 
jurisdiction in which a firm might keep its headquarters, UK lawmakers 
arguably have incentives to promulgate legislation capable of attracting 
firms incorporated in other member states. Even though UK lawmakers 
lack a charter revenue motive to attract foreign firms, they will seek to 
provide legal rules that are attractive to firms’ managers because British 
business lawyers and accountants will benefit from increased fee 
revenues. Unlike their counterparts in the United States, the British Bar 
associations have yet to step in to solve collective action problems 
regarding the drafting and enactment of beneficial legislation. Of course, 
UK lawyers and accountants will be even more willing to undertake the 
commitment to develop new business organization laws when they face 
competition from other states to retain in-state firms.50 Yet, to the extent 
that British accountants have sufficient incentives to externalize costs, 
they have already mobilized to lobby lawmakers to enact legislation that 
meets their demands and preferences.51 
                                                     
49 See, e.g., B. Black, ‘Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis’, 
84 Northwestern University Law Review (1990) (explaining that Delaware’s competitive 
success is due to its specialized judiciary); R. Romano, ‘Law as a Product: Some Pieces 
of the Incorporation Puzzle’, 1 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (1985) 
(explaining that businesses benefit from Delaware’s well-developed precedent); 
Cheffins, supra footnote 39, p. 443 (suggesting that the UK’s Chancery Division and a 
large stock of legal precedent could provide benefits for non-UK firms incorporating in 
Britain). 
50 Cf. L.A. Bebchuk and A. Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, Working 
Paper (2002). 
51 See J.A. McCahery and E.P.M. Vermeulen, ‘The Evolution of Closely Held Business 
Forms in Europe’, 26 Journal of Corporation Law (2001). 








Although it is likely that the United Kingdom holds the strongest card 
in the competition for business formations, other jurisdictions could also 
be encouraged to enter the market for business forms. In particular, 
smaller jurisdictions with sufficient resources may, supported by well-
organized interest groups, decide to act entrepreneurially themselves. 
They may be motivated to help lift the curse on regulatory competition 
in Europe by actively attempting to maximize chartering revenues.52 If 
the future shows that the most favourable jurisdiction dominates the 
domicile choice of firms, as envisaged in recent ECJ case law, increases 
in interest group pressure for competitive lawmaking can be expected. 
As noted earlier, small jurisdictions like Ireland or Luxembourg, would 
also be likely candidates to enter the competitive lawmaking 
environment for the supply of law as a product. As such, a leading state 
could reap the benefits by coming forward with a menu of business 
forms ideally suited to the preferences of closely held firms across the 
spectrum.53 If such a jurisdiction were among the early group of movers 
to adopt competitive business forms, it could very well create a focal 
point, leading a significant number of domestic and foreign firms to 
select from a new generation of business forms. In turn, this could give 
such a country the lead in business formations. While the best available 
evidence indicates that the roadblocks to a market for competitive 
lawmaking within the European Union are substantial, it might be argued 
that smaller jurisdictions, highly exposed to the international market, 
                                                     
52 The double taxation treaties most European countries have entered into act as a 
disincentive for jurisdictions to engage in regulatory competition. Cf. Cheffins (1997: 
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(Oxford, Oxford University Press 2001) pp. 18 and 271. 
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may have significant incentives to compete for inward investment by 
offering competitive business organization laws. 
As Europe enters the competitive lawmaking environment, lawmakers 
will mainly focus on the needs of business firms that are most likely to 
engage in forum shopping. Since the Directives regarding publicly held 
corporations have reduced the feasibility of competition in the context of 
large corporations, European lawmakers will begin to turn their attention 
to ‘closely held firms’, such as large professional firms, venture capital 
funds, joint ventures and high-tech start-ups. Although jurisdictional 
competition in Europe is still in a developmental stage, the empirical 
evidence lends support to this view. We can already foresee a pattern of 
regulatory competition in the context of business organization law that 
prompts competitive lawmakers to innovate by initiating law reforms 
and introducing new legal entities that are better equipped than the 
traditional partnership and corporate forms to meet the changed needs of 
these firms. 
It is important for responsive lawmakers to concentrate on the needs 
of firms in practice. Highly developed legislation for business firms at all 
levels signals that a jurisdiction is responsive to the demands of the 
business society. Furthermore, by having such a legal framework in 
place, jurisdictions mitigate the costs of statutory ambiguity and, hence, 
negative spill-over effects. From this perspective, introducing a separate 
limited partnership-form designed with the venture capital industry in 
mind is arguably necessary to prevent distortion of choice-of-business-
form decisions and the resulting legal problems that arise when 
economic actors choose sub-optimal structures. This would allow choice 
of business forms to send a clearer signal about the parties’ 
organizational needs. We now turn to examine recent efforts by UK 
lawmakers to introduce business forms tailored to the needs of a 
particular class of firms. It is suggested that the introduction of such a 
legal framework is crucial to stimulate the development of a robust 
venture capital environment in Europe. 








5. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP LAW REFORM IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
Prompted by the threat of competition in combination with the lobbying 
efforts of, among others, venture capitalists and sophisticated investors, 
UK lawmakers recently published a report on partnership law reform in 
which they propose modern limited partnership legislation. The reform 
intends to abolish the rule on the maximum number of partners – 
presently limited to twenty – and introduce ‘safe harbour’ provisions, 
which, like those found in the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act and Jersey’s limited partnership form, clearly establish 
that limited partners may participate in the control of the firm so as to 
improve certainty and accessibility to foreign investors. 
 Indeed, following the needs of commercial solicitors, UK lawmakers 
have proposed safe harbour provisions that offers guidance for limited 
partners, such as large institutional investors, concerning a list of 
activities in respect of his permissible involvement in a partnership. 
These include participation in (1) strategic decisions; (2) enforcement of 
rights; (3) approval of accounts of the limited partnership; (4) 
engagement in contractual work for the partnership; (5) acting as a 
director, employee or shareholder in a corporate general partner; (6) 
resolution of conflict of interest problems; and (7) consultation and 
advice.54 
 As for the entity-aggregate issue, UK lawmakers embrace the entity 
approach for the general and limited partnership form. They 
acknowledge that the legal entity status is a necessary shorthand device 
to define the property rights over with participants within a firm can 
contract.55 However, given the importance of tax considerations in 
choosing a business form, the possible uncertainty about tax authorities’ 
reaction to the introduction of bestowing partnerships with legal entity 
status, the UK lawmakers were forced to adopt a limited partnership 
                                                     
54 See Schedule 6 of the UK Partnership Bill (The Law Commission and the Scottish 
Law Commission, Partnership Law, Report on a Reference under Section 3(1)(e) of the 
Law Commissions Act 1965, 2003). 
55 H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘The Essential Role of Organizational Law’, 110 Yale 
Law Journal (2000). 








without separate legal personality in order to circumvent cumbersome 
characterization issues. Given the need to attract more foreign investors, 
the special limited partnership without legal personality is obviously 
better able to preserve tax benefits overseas.56 
 Besides the preservation of tax transparency, legal clarity plays a 
pivotal role in private venture capital investments. The UK lawmakers 
rightly assume that the business parties involved in venture capital 
contracting create detailed legal agreements themselves.57 As a 
consequence, in place of applying default rules of the General and 
Limited Partnership to the special vehicle, which has several spillover 
disadvantages, the lawmakers explicitly delink the special limited 
partnership from the other partnership forms.58 By doing so, lawmakers 
recognize that default rules may impede the introduction of new 
contractual and financial incentive mechanisms. Moreover, the stickiness 
of default rule provisions may lead to uncertainty as to the enforceability 
of contractual modifications of the default rules. 
 Yet even if this vehicle represents a new policy direction in 
partnership law, it is unclear whether it creates a successful, low-cost 
solution for investors and venture capitalists alike. Although the UK 
lawmakers disapply most of the general and limited partnership default 
rules, the special limited partnership is still to some extent linked to the 
other partnership forms.59 It is clear that the approach chosen by the UK 
                                                     
56 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Partnership Law, Report on 
a Reference under Section 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965, 2003, p. 27: 
‘Serious concerns have been expressed to us, particularly by the APP (Association of 
Partnership Practitioners), that giving legal personality to limited partnerships may affect 
their tax treatment overseas, and that uncertainty over that issue would affect their 
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57 Cf. Gilson, supra footnote 34. 
58 See Schedule 10 of the UK Partnership Bill (The Law Commission and the Scottish 
Law Commission, Partnership Law, Report on a Reference under Section 3(1)(e) of the 
Law Commissions Act 1965, 2003). 
59 For an overview of the different forms of linkage between statutory forms, see L.E. 
Ribstein, ‘Linking Statutory Forms’, 58 Law and Contemporary Problems (1995). 
Besides the situation in which business form statutes are linked in the sense that rules 
from one statute are applied to a business form created under another statute, Ribstein 
distinguishes three other variations on linkage: (1) explicit linkage (one statute governs 








lawmakers might lead to some uncertainty even though the contracting 
parties are professionals with significant bargaining power. Even though 
contract parties are willing to accept the challenge of drafting an 
agreement for the special limited partnership, transaction costs, 
information asymmetries and strategic behaviour could prevent them 
from bargaining their way to an optimal agreement. As a consequence, 
with respect to some operating formalities, such as fiduciary duties, the 
special limited partnership resembles a normal limited partnership.60 In 
other respects, the special limited partnership constitutes a new 
partnership vehicle. In any event, the United Kingdom has clearly 
responded to the demands of a particular class of firms, such as 
investment funds, that possess the resources and capacity to draft 
comprehensive operational agreements that meet their special 
requirements.  
 
 [insert table here] 
 
6. TOWARD A MORE EFFICIENT SPECIAL LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP STATUTE 
At first glance, this form of linkage of partnership vehicles within one 
statute has obvious benefits (e.g., clarity and simplicity). Note that 
linkage has the advantage that general partnerships can easily convert to 
the limited partnerships and vice versa without having to deal with the 
cumbersome formalities of changing to a completely new business form. 
Furthermore, special limited partnerships have access to the same 
                                                                                                                      
two business forms); (2) implicit linkage (a business form statute imports language from 
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60 See The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Partnership Law, Report 
on a Reference under Section 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965, 2003, p. 300: 
‘At the same time, our recommended reforms in relation to the overriding duty of good 
faith and the statutory statement of duties of disclosure on joining a partnership are as 
applicable to the special limited partnership as to any other partnership as are many 
default rules, for example, in relation to the sharing of profits and losses and the 
management of the business. 








network and learning benefits as the other partnership forms. However, 
linking may also involve significant costs for business parties (e.g., 
distortions in the signalling function of business forms, erroneous gap-
filling by courts and negative spill-over effects, and complications in 
contracting around fiduciary duties) that outweigh possible linking 
benefits.61  
 This is especially true for fiduciary duties. Indeed, even if parties 
could contract around fiduciary duties for their relationship, it is 
important that the role of fiduciary duties varies across business forms. 
Parties that want to remain unaffected by statutory fiduciary duties may, 
despite the default rule status of these duties, be reluctant to choose the 
special limited partnership. For instance, for the sake of fairness, courts 
may be inclined to impose fiduciary duties when disputes between the 
parties arise. Furthermore, given the stickiness of default rules, parties 
may be loath to contract around fiduciary duties. It is therefore argued 
that in venture capital fund limited partnerships the role of fiduciary 
duties should be limited.62 First, the venture capital fund contracts deal 
with the monitoring and information asymmetry problems extensively. 
Second, the venture capitalists, as general partners, act as co-owners 
rather than ‘fiduciaries on behalf of the limited partners’. Third, in the 
venture capital industry, extra-legal mechanisms, like reputation, often 
play a crucial role in preventing opportunism. In this respect, fiduciary 
duties could even hamper the functioning of the extra-legal mechanisms. 
Not only could the opportunistic use of these duties involve costly intra-
relationship disputes and litigation, but, as noted, it could also increase 
the transaction costs of contracting around them.63  
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62 See L.E. Ribstein, Confining Fiduciary Duties, Working Paper 2002; D. Rosenberg, 
‘Venture Capital Limited Partnerships: A Study in Freedom of Contract’, Columbia 
Business Law Review (2002).  
63 Commentators note that explicit legal remedies crowd out the positive effect of extra-
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The US Uniform Limited Partnership Act 2001 (ULPA 2001) deals 
partly with this problem by providing that a limited partner does not 
have any fiduciary duty to the limited partnership or to any other partner 
solely by reason of being a limited partner.64 As for the general partners 
the ULPA seems to follow the wording of the partnership act. However, 
for the reasons mentioned above, it is more efficient that a special 
limited partnership statute provides that the rights and duties of the 
parties will be specified in their agreement.65 
The UK’s special limited partnership has yet another flaw in its 
design. As we have seen,66 changing economic conditions often entail 
the need for new contractual regimes, which enlarge the control of the 
limited partners over the venture.67 As a consequence, a special limited 
partnership form which offers a staggering degree of freedom to design 
the relationship between the investors and the venture capitalists seems 
necessary to facilitate negotiations and renegotiations without being held 
back by restricted rules.68 In this view, the list in Schedule 6 of the UK 
                                                     
64 See ULPA 2001 §305. 
65 In order to clarify the range of fiduciary duties in special limited partnerships, UK 
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66 See Section 3. 
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(1985) p. 296. 
68 Cf. M.D. Goldman and E.M. Filliben, ‘Corporate Governance: Current Trends and 
Likely Developments for the Twenty-First Century’, 25 Delaware Journal of Corporate 
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Partnership Bill could be too limited in range.69 For the special limited 
partnership an extensive control rule may be more attractive to foreign, 
especially US, investors. For instance, Delaware’s extensive safe harbour 
provisions allow limited partners’ intervention to a much larger extent, 
but doesn’t offer a full protection since the rule still inhibits several 
limited partner actions. If a limited partner in a Delaware limited 
partnership participates in the control of the business, he is liable only to 
persons who transact business with the limited partnership reasonably 
believing, based upon the limited partner’s conduct, that the limited 
partner is a general partner.70 
In the laboratory of regulatory competition, the pressure on the 
mandatory obligation to have one or more general partners that are, by 
definition, unlimitedly liable for the debts and obligations of the firm is 
increasing. From a relatively early date, legal practitioners solved the 
problem of general partners’ unlimited liability by creating a hybrid 
business form between the limited partnership and a corporation, which 
played the role of a general partner. However, despite the popularity of 
the limited partnership with a corporate partner, it is not always efficient 
to use this hybrid form. Besides the fact that it is not recognized or is 
prohibited from engaging in specific kinds of activities in some 
countries, the limited partnership with a corporation as the sole 
shareholder is an incomplete response, because this vehicle comprises 
two business entities that must be organized and administered separately. 
For this reason the ULPA 2001 permits limited liability limited 
partnership election which protects general partners against claims 
arising from the firm’s obligations and debts. 
Finally, a limited partnership with shares, in which the general 
partners have exclusive management control and the limited partners 
may transfer their shares freely, appears to respond to the pent-up 
                                                     
69 In order to have some flexibility, the UK lawmakers propose that the Secretary of State 
may by order amend Schedule 6 (by adding, modifying or omitting an activity). 
70 See section 17-303 of the Delaware Limited Partnership Act. ULPA 2001 provides that 
a limited partner is not personally liable, even if the limited partner participates in the 
management and control of the limited partnership (ULPA 2001 §303). This approach, 
however, is wrong headed since it disregards the importance of the governance structure 
of the limited partnership for venture capital funds.  








demand for more easily tradable private investments. As interest in 
venture capital funds already change hands increasingly in the secondary 
market, the conversion to a combination of a limited partnership and 
public corporation, which offers ready access to liquidity and market 
price, could be a viable alternative. However, several EU Directives 
apply to the limited partnerships with a share capital, which makes 
implementation cumbersome. The special limited partnership provisions 
should nevertheless explicitly allow for the transferability of the limited 
partners’ interest. In order to be competitive, legal and fiscal 
complications regarding the transfer of interests should be minimized. 
For instance, the administrative burden of officially registering the name 
of each limited partner and the amount of any relevant capital 
contribution made by the limited partners should be omitted.71 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
This article explored the dynamic of regulatory competition on the 
change in the structure of legal business forms. The analysis focused on 
the economic importance of the limited partnership form’s features for 
the creation of a robust venture capital market. It was shown that the 
introduction of a modern limited partnership form, which features the 
protection of the limited partners and is limited partner-friendly, 
promises to benefit the venture capital industry in Europe. 
 We have suggested that the advent of competitive pressures regarding 
law reforms has created some incentives for national lawmakers to 
generate new statutory measures. It identified the recent introduction of 
the special limited partnership form in the United Kingdom--in order to 
                                                     
71 See clause 66 and 68 in conjunction with Schedule 7 of the UK Partnership Bill. Form 
a historical point of view, the Law Commission’s recommendation to consider 
registration as a prerequisite for limited liability is misguided. The mediaeval limited 
partnership, the commenda, offered investors limited liability and anonymity. By doing 
so, this business form made it possible for special interest groups, such as the nobles and 
the clergy, to pour money into lucrative ventures without risking being condemned for 
usury or violating inhibitions against engaging in trade. See, e.g., J.W. Callison, 
Partnership Law and Practice, General and Limited Partnerships (St. Paul, West Group 
2001). 








stem the outflow of venture capital funds and investment vehicles to 
other jurisdictions—as a prime instance of competitive lawmaking in 
Europe. Our doctrinal analysis of the UK special limited partnership 
statute shows that lawmakers have responded to the competitive dynamic 
by supplying features that are valued by investment firms. Even though 
the special limited partnership statute offers a competitive business form 
for venture capital funds, we identify some reasons why the legislation in 
some respects does not fully meet the needs of investors. Accordingly, 
the analysis here offers a number of recommendations to address the 
problems identified in the legislation.  
 
